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Divergent Teleology:
A Response to Zoe Grabow’s Reconciliation of Taylor and Aristotle
In this paper, I will provide a commentary of “Unified Teleology: Paul Taylor’s
Biocentric Egalitarianism through Aristotle.” In addition to providing an account of Zoe
Grabow’s reconciliation of Aristotle’s value ethics with Paul Taylor’s “respect for nature,” I will
also attempt to offer a few thoughts on some of the primary philosophical tensions mentioned by
Grabow. The most notable of these issues include the adoption of Aristotle’s ancient philosophy
to a modern conception of environmental ethics, the limitations of Taylor’s “biocentric
egalitarianism”, and the nature of the relationship between humans and the environment.
It would be prudent however to first establish a set of descriptions for the most
commonly used ideas in the essay. Some concepts are defined by the author, others are defined
relative to my understanding of their popular usage. “Nature” refers to the set of living and nonliving things which comprise the planetary environment, sometimes viewed in opposite relation
to the human element. “Respect” is a term defined by Taylor as “an ultimate moral [human]
attitude” that when applied to nature binds humankind to a protection of living things and a
promotion of their good for their own sake (The Ethics of Respect for Nature, 197-8). Living
things in this instance refers to those entities which have their own biological interests and exist
to fulfill some end (or telos).1
Taylor’s biocentric egalitarianism refers to the positive treatment of all living things in
nature based upon the inherent equal value that all natural entities possess. Grabow redefines this
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Grabow and Taylor both do not seem to concern themselves with microfauna, or the role of smaller, unobservable
organisms in nature. Rather, the interest is in what is referred to as “plant life” or “animals”, presumably those
members of the various species of flora or macrofauna that are observable or whose negative treatment is felt and
seen by other members of the surrounding environment. This is not to say that Grabow and Taylor would not be
concerned with the effects of human pollution or environmental damage on these smaller organisms; it is rather that
the examples given focus on the treatment and preservation of “nature” as a whole, with preference given to the
larger species of plant and animal life (a hierarchical argument readily identified by Grabow on pages 9-10 of their
essay).
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respect as the preservation of the right to survival for every living entity, the denial of speciesism
and other environmental or biological prejudices, and the fair and unbiased treatment of all living
things as defined by Taylor in his work Respect for Nature (Grabow, 8). One objection to this
particular view that deserves clarification is identified by Grabow as a general critique of
egalitarianism itself. “If all things have value,” Grabow problematizes, “they are all equally
valueless” (6). The issue here is the lack of relative value which serves as the foundation of an
egalitarian moral theory. This is essentially problematic for theorists who privilege the human
element above the non-human element, and denote those actions that are positive or negative
inasmuch as they are aligned toward a treatment of other humans or neutral inasmuch as they
relate to the lack of moral obligation towards non-human entities.
The issue of the absence of relative value, especially as related to the human/non-human
(or sentient/non-sentient, intelligent/non-intelligent, etc.) dichotomy, is somewhat alleviated by
the preferential treatment of living things over non-living things. This view seems to be partially
supported by Aristotle (who also holds a higher moral opinion of living things over non-living
things, though still argues for the dominance of humankind over all other living creatures). The
moral preference for living things over non-living things serves as the basis for Taylor’s
biocentrism and becomes the primary method for identifying proper moral action (i.e. if it is a
living thing, treat it well). There is still the obvious question of why the quality of life itself is
preferred (in Taylor’s account) to the quality of sentience (in Aristotle’s account) or even the
favored treatment of certain living things over those other living or non-living things that might
be favored by the modern human (e.g. family, knowledge, money, or the conception of enhanced
human survival over the survival of other species). In response to this, Grabow and Taylor both
point out the evident bias that exists in any human-centric conception of ethics (8). The goal in
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accepting Taylor’s egalitarianism is then to understand the ways in which our human character
may already inform a preference for the human element over the non-human element found in
the already non-human environment. The attempt at moving away from an anthropocentric
conception of moral action to a biocentric one focuses the discussion on treating living things
well and equally “for the sake of’ themselves, out of respect for their own teleological goals.
The teleological aspect of Taylor’s account is perhaps the most contentious, as it
readdress the problem of the human/non-human distinction (or more appropriately, the
hierarchical ordering of living organisms). For Taylor, removing a living creature from its
biological interests, such as survival or reproduction (that organism’s telos), constitutes a moral
wrong. However, this seems to be an insufficient basis for the proper treatment of living things
for two related reasons: first, that the conflicting interests of various organisms reignites the
debate over which organism’s telos is preferred when they cannot be reconciled2; and second,
that the proper [human] treatment of living things is already inherently anthropocentric, since the
evaluation of an organism’s natural interests is subject to human prejudice. This is perhaps why
Grabow points us towards an understanding of both Taylor and Aristotle as supporting the
negative rights of (non-human?) living things only; that is, that it would be wrong to harm any
other living creature directly or indirectly, but morally uncertain as to whether or not it would be
permissible to “save” other living things or “undo” the environmental damage that has been done
in the past or by other living creatures (i.e. humans) in the present. Ultimately the reading of
Aristotle as supporting Taylor holds inasmuch as Taylor is guilty of the “weak egalitarianism”
Grabow defines on 9-10, and is suspect to supporting the notion that human beings are separate
from nature and other living beings.
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Grabow identifies the ways in which Taylor begins to admit of a kind of “weak egalitarianism” when he
preferences the treatment of certain living things over others (9-10)
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However, a positive reading of Taylor might support the idea that humankind is in fact a
part of nature, and that all living creatures are subject to the same kind of ethical criteria that he
seems to be advocating for with regard to the way in which human beings as a whole negatively
treat the environment. The only reason it may seem as though human beings are separate from
the rest of nature is because we might believe we are the only species to have evolved outside of
our primary biological interests; that is, we have found a new telos that is not subject to the
biological restrictions of those other species found in nature (a view which would most likely be
supported by Aristotle). Our primary responsibility as a species is to then support the biological
teloi of other species, just as much as they support our own. Were it possible for other species to
disregard their biological impetus and attempt to fulfill a goal that infringed on the natural rights
of other species, then they too would be committing a kind of unethical action similar to that
which the human creature performs frequently, through the continued negative harm of the
natural environment: it creatures, its fauna, and the air, land, and water we all share.

